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The use of Chapter 11 to reorganize Chrysler and General Motors ("GM") was undeniably high
profile and has led to significant debate, discussion and criticism from bankruptcy scholars,
practitioners and policy makers. In fact, almost every leading American corporate bankruptcy
academic has spoken against the automotive bankruptcy cases. The most common critique went
along the lines of the all-encompassing accusation that the Chrysler and GM cases undermined
the entire Chapter 11 process, and even the rule of law, in a way that would have repercussions
for debt markets for years to come.
In this article, using a comparative approach (Canadian versus American and automotive versus
financial sectors), we build on the defense of the Chapter 11 automotive cases that one of us has
already put forward elsewhere. That is, the Chrysler and GM cases did not subvert normal
Chapter 11 practice.1 Rather, we argue that the automotive cases are a good case study of how
governments can provide money to a failing but significant industry in a consistent and
transparent manner. This article is not about whether governments should fund failing
industries. Rather, we argue that once such a decision has been made, the bankruptcy system is
an effective way to implement such a decision. Further, using the bankruptcy system to effect
government funding of a failing industry does not distort the bankruptcy system.
Our starting point is that what was different in the automotive as compared to other Chapter 11
cases was the identity of the debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lender—the American and Canadian
governments. As one of us has already observed, while the "identity of the DIP lender is novel
what happened is routine. And the identity of the lender is not a bankruptcy issue."2 In the
automotive cases, the identity of the DIP lender was a question of economic reality. Obtaining
DIP financing is an essential element of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization, as it allows
debtors to maintain sufficient liquidity during the reorganization and obtain post-petition loans to
help them emerge from bankruptcy.3 However, following the credit crisis, it became increasingly
difficult to obtain DIP financing, as "the usual lenders … have exited the market, presumably
due to either a lack of liquidity or their own financial struggles."4 As such, it was necessary to
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seek out alternative DIP lenders;5 in the case of Chrysler and especially GM, where the DIP loan
was the largest ever obtained by a debtor, the U.S. and Canadian governments filled this void.
Part II provides an overview of the Chrysler and GM Cases. Part III considers the criticism and
commentary surrounding the use of Chapter 11 in the automotive cases. Part IV situates the
Chrysler and GM cases in the context of the broader bailout versus bankruptcy debates. Part V
uses the examples of Bear Sterns, AIG, Citibank and Lehman Brothers to suggests that the use of
Chapter 11 over a bailout is supported by American experience beyond the automotive cases.
And Part VI considers the bankruptcy versus bailout approach in the Canadian context and
explores a recent Canadian example – the Asset Back Commercial Paper Crisis (ABCP) – to
illustrate how bankruptcy has been used over bailout in the Canadian context and the limits to
expanding this approach across borders. Part VII concludes.
II.

Overview of the Chapter 11 Automotive Cases

In 2009, North American automotive manufacturers Chrysler and GM filed Chapter 11 cases as a
result of ongoing financial difficulties that suddenly came to a head as a result of the wider
economic crisis. These cases involved substantial similarities, and in many respects Chrysler
provided a kind of “test run” for its larger, latter counterpart. For example, both Chrysler and
GM's bankruptcies involved "quick sales" under section 363 of Chapter 11.6 Under this section, a
DIP is permitted, under some conditions, to sell their assets free and clear of any interest in them.
The benefit of a sale under §363 is that it tends to be much faster than a detailed Chapter 11 plan
under §§1123 and 1129. By providing for a faster sale, §363 sales are usually the best option in
dealing with ongoing losses, limited lender funding commitments, and rapidly depleting assets.7
Once a DIP chooses to dispose of its assets in a quick sale, the typical process entails finding an
initial bidder (often known as a "stalking horse," for reasons that mystify many, including the
authors) and approval of bidding procedures.8 The overarching goal of this process is to
maximize the value of the estate, thereby increasing creditors' returns.9
Although the Chrysler and GM cases followed the basic framework for a quick sale, they were
noteworthy for their historical and economic importance, the speed at which they occurred, and
perhaps most significantly, because both corporations received substantial financing from the
U.S. and Canadian governments.10 As one of us describes:
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In both cases, U.S. Treasury and the governments of Canada and Ontario agreed
to provide the automakers with DIP financing on the condition that a sale of each
debtor's assets occur on an expedited basis so as to preserve the value of the
business, restore consumer confidence, and avoid the costs of a lengthy chapter 11
process. In both cases the purchaser of the assets was a newly created entity,
funded by the North American governments. In exchange for wage cuts that
brought the automakers in line with their foreign competitors, and the union's
promise not to strike for several years, the purchasers agreed to give equity stakes
in the reorganized company to the UAW's retiree health care trust, called the
Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations (VEBA). 11
More specifically, in the Chrysler case, its two largest creditors were secured creditors owed $6.9
billion and an unsecured employee benefit plan, owed $10 billion. It owed trade creditors $5.3
billion, and it had a warranty and dealer obligations of several billion dollars. To address these
issues, the various governments created and funded a shell company ("New Chrysler"), which,
through a § 363 sale, bought substantially all of Chrysler's assets for $2 billion. This gave the
secured creditors a return of 29 cents on the dollar. Fiat was then brought in to manage the new
firm and was given twenty percent of the purchaser's equity, with rights to obtain a majority
stake in the future upon payment of governmental claims. New Chrysler assumed the old
company's debts to the union retirees, most dealers and trade creditors. The unsecured claims of
the retirees' benefits plans were replaced with a new $4.6 billion note as well as 55 percent of the
new company's stock.12
Although the majority of Chrysler's senior lenders approved of the government's plan with Fiat,
certain distressed debt buyers, primarily two Indiana pension funds, raised several objections,
including the claim that the quick sale was essentially a plan in disguise.13 However, the pension
funds' arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, which added that—having contractually
given up their right to independent action—the funds also lacked standing to bring their
objections.14
As with Chrysler, GM had both secured and unsecured debt, owing $19.4 billion on pre-petition
debt to the U.S. Treasury and a billions more to a range of secured lenders, including a syndicate
of lenders led by Citicorp US, Inc. ($3.9 billion); a syndicate of lenders led by JP Morgan Chase
($1.5 billion); Export Development Bank Canada ($400 million); and Gelco Corporation ($125
million).15 Additionally, GM had $117 billion in unsecured debt to creditors such as the United
11
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Auto Workers Trust (UAW Trust).16 After GM filed for Chapter 11, $30.1 billion in DIP
financing was given by the U.S. Treasury and $3.2 billion was provided by the Canadian
government, with another $6 billion to be provided later.17
In terms of the GM agreement, its structure was quite similar to Chrysler's. As with Chrysler, a
new entity was formed ("New GM"), which purchased all of the substantial operating assets of
the Old GM and also assumed some of its key liabilities, such as those owed to the UAW Trust.18
In exchange, Old GM received ten percent of the equity in the reorganized company, in addition
to warrants to buy up to fifteen percent more equity in certain circumstances.19 The U.S. and
Canadian governments, owed $50 billion in combined pre- and post-petition financing, assigned
their loans to new GM, which credit bid for the assets of Old GM.20
In the end, the "first-priority secured lenders of Old GM (other than the U.S. Treasury and the
Canadian government) were repaid their claims in full by New GM. The unsecured lenders
received … [the aforementioned equity stake in New GM]. The shareholders of Old GM
received nothing."21 It is worth noting that as with Chrysler, the UAW made concessions with
the New GM with respect to employee compensation and benefits, receiving common stock
(with warrants to purchase more), preferred stock and an additional $2.5 billion dollar note in
exchange for their compromise.22
III.

Criticism and Commentary on the Automotive Cases

Barry Adler's allegation that the "descent of Chrysler and General Motors into bankruptcy
threatens the Chapter 11 reorganization process itself,"23 is representative of the bulk of the
commentary on the automotive cases. Although Adler concedes that these cases were successful
insofar as they "quickly removed assets from the burden of unmanageable debt amidst a global
recession," he adds that the "price of this achievement was unnecessarily high because the cases
established or buttressed precedent for the disregard of creditor rights."24 Essentially, Adler
posits that the manner in which the automotive bankruptcies were carried out favoured certain
creditors, while denying the rights of others. Accordingly, Adler and other proponents of this
perspective argue that the Chrysler and GM cases "may usher in a period where the spectre of
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insolvency will increase the cost of capital in an economy where affordable credit is sorely
needed."25
A number of responses can and have been put forward. First, the over-availability of credit is
partially responsible for the recent credit crisis in the first place. Accordingly, it is open to debate
whether affordable credit is actually what this economy needs and what "affordable" should
mean. The difference between “affordable” and “under priced” is often difficult to discern.
More importantly, although many critics believe that these cases involved a "precedent-setting
distortion of bankruptcy priorities,"26 this is not necessarily the case. Rather, that these cases
simply reflected the standard US regime, as it has existed for at least a decade. As Edward
Morrison argues, these cases "exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured creditors—
especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy case—control over the fate of
distressed firms. Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM
cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders."27 Or, as one of us
less politely explained, “In the past decade lenders have learned how to play the chapter 11 game
. . . when I see these same institutional investors acting like Captain Renault, I'm skeptical.”28
Specifically, in these cases, the U.S. and Canadian governments used their power as DIP lender
to "influence management, force a sale of good assets and favored debts (to the UAW) to a
government-owned entity, and let the court distribute remaining assets to creditors left behind in
the bankruptcy estate."29 Accordingly, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies did not "break new
ground" by altering priority rules; instead, they relied on the procedures commonly used in
Chapter 11 reorganizations.30 Whether secured lender domination of the Chapter 11 process is a
good thing is open to debate, but is not limited to the automotive cases.
In addition to the argument that the Chrysler and GM cases subverted traditional priority rules,
critics have argued—along similar lines—that in these cases bankruptcy courts failed to honor
the entitlement for which creditors contract. Moreover, these dissenters also highlighted the fact
that in Chrysler secured creditors received 29 cents on the dollar, and general unsecured creditors
received nothing.31
In GM secured creditors were paid in full and unsecured creditors received a partial payment.
That looks a lot like application of the absolute priority rule.
25
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In response to the broader point, one of us has already argued that it essentially amounts to a
"statement that the government should prefer investors over unions."32 Yet, determining which
creditors should be preferred is a matter of policy, and despite arguments that these cases
violated the "rule of law," the "rule of law is not violated by a policy disagreement."33
With respect to complaints about the amount received by secured creditors under the quick sale,
these are also perplexing, as 30 cents on the dollar is a relatively average recovery rate during a
bankruptcy. As Nouriel Roubini notes "in the past seven months, completed Credit Delivery
Swap ("CDS") auctions results in a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar for loans and 15 cents
on the dollar for bonds,"34 despite better results in the past.
Similarly, critics of the Chrysler and GM Chapter 11 cases underscore the fact that shareholders
received nothing for their equity positions.35 However, much like the recovery rate of 30 cents on
the dollar for secured creditors, this too is not unusual. Rather, claims by shareholders for the
return of equity do not rank as claims of creditors in bankruptcy. Accordingly, under bankruptcy
law, shareholders do not recover anything unless the claims of all creditors are satisfied.36 As
such, it is curious why critics would question these particular elements of the Chrysler and GM
cases.
In addition to the general criticisms outlined above, academics also took issue with specific
elements of the Chrysler and GM cases. For example, testifying before Congress, Douglas Baird
claimed that the bidding procedures approved by the courts in the Chrysler and GM quick sales
"amounted to an impermissible, stealth reorganization plan because bidders were required to
treat the unions in the same manner as the initial, government-sponsored bidder."37 This
argument is significant insofar as courts have developed rules to curb the imposition of
reorganization plans under the §363 sales process.38 However, a ready response to this argument
has already been made that in light of the dearth of alternative bidders in the automotive cases,
bidding procedures are entirely irrelevant.39 Specifically, given the state of credit markets,
"those who take for granted the existence of unknown or theoretical bidders have some

32
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obligation to explain how such a bidder would have bought GM, a company with $27 billion of
secured debt."40
As mentioned above, in an economic climate where DIP financing is scarce, it bears questioning
whether there were truly any better options for GM and Chrysler. If there were better options,
one can easily surmise that the governments of the US and Canada would have happily washed
their hands of the entire matter.
IV.

The Bankruptcy versus Bailout Debate

Following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis and the unveiling of the U.S. Treasury's 2008
bailout plan, there has been considerable debate in the U.S. as to whether bankruptcy or bailouts
produce more desirable results for failing companies and for the economy as a whole. In
particular, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury's differing treatment of Bear Sterns, which
was bailed out, and Lehman Brothers, which went bankrupt, and then AIG, which was bailed
out, are at the forefront of this discussion. These cases are compared and discussed in more detail
in the next section, illustrating that our argument for bankruptcy over bailout extends beyond the
automotive cases.
In 2008, the U.S. Treasury's bailout plan was enacted, in an attempt to improve bank balance
sheets and, consequently, to spur bank lending.41 Among the justifications offered was the fact
that "as of early September 2008, major banks were facing imminent failure because their
mortgage-backed assets had declined rapidly in value."42 These banks, essentially, were deemed
too big to fail, especially when failures were apt to come in bunches. Implicit in this argument is
the sense that failing—or going bankrupt—in this case, would be catastrophic. Accordingly, the
central "benefit" of a bailout in this case was that it is not bankruptcy.
Indeed, one of the key arguments often advanced in favor of bailouts is the ability to sidestep
supposedly severe consequences that follow from a bankruptcy.43 Proponents of this approach
focus on two particular "shortcomings" of bankruptcy. First, critics emphasize the impact of
bankruptcy "on the value of the distressed firm itself. Bankruptcy, the reasoning goes would
severely dissipate the value of the firm's assets."44 These concerns are characterized as "firmspecific risks."45 Second, critics of bankruptcy cite the negative consequences of a bankruptcy
filing outside the firm, as "bankruptcy filing directly affects the firm's contractual counterparties,
some of whom, such as lenders and derivatives counterparties, have direct claims on the firms,
while others hold contracts whose value is tied to the distressed firm."46 The premise of this
40

Lubben, "No Big Deal,"ibid.

41
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argument is that a bankruptcy filing has "spillover effects," such that on the bankruptcy of one
firm, several others and possibly the economy as a whole are adversely affected.
In response, proponents of the bankruptcy process posit that there are significant drawbacks to
relying on bailouts. For example, Kenneth Ayotte and David Skeel characterize bailouts as "adhoc" and "last minute rescue efforts."47 They argue that
The rescue loan approach favored in the financial crisis increased uncertainty,
increased the costs of moral hazard and dampened the incentive of private actors
to resolve distress before a desperate 'day of reckoning' arose. These forces
created substantial cost to the taxpayer of rescue funding.48
Ayotte and Skeel also tackle the specific two-pronged argument of bailout enthusiasts. With
respect to the issue of firm-specific risks, they state that the "firm specific risks of Chapter 11 are
overstated," adding that "the law gives distressed firms several advantages in bankruptcy that are
unavailable outside of bankruptcy. These advantages help preserve firm value, allocate control
rights to residual claimants, and do a more effective job of handling moral hazard concerns than
taxpayer-funded rescue loans on the eve of bankruptcy."49Ayotte and Skeel acknowledge that
there is no perfect solution—when a firm is failing, someone always loses. They contend that:
The distress of financial firms thus poses an inescapable choice: regulators must
either allow counterparties to take losses, and thus confront the possibility of
systemic effects, or they must use taxpayer money to prevent the losses from
being realized. Bankruptcy has proven to be an adequate mechanism for handling
the former choice, and it is flexible enough to accommodate the latter.50
With respect to the alleged systemic risks of bankruptcy, it is questionable whether they are
restricted to bankruptcy proceedings alone. Indeed, "[s]ome of these systemic costs … would
arise in any procedure that forces counterparties to bear losses when there are not enough to
satisfy all counterparty claims."51Jeffrey Miron concurs, claiming that "U.S. policymakers should
have allowed the standard process of bankruptcy to operate."52 Miron claims that although
bankruptcy "would not have avoided all the costs of the crisis … it would plausibly have
moderated those costs relative to a bailout. Even more, the bankruptcy approach would have
reduced rather than enhanced the likelihood of future crises."53
Additionally, with respect to systemic risks, it is difficult to determine whether the "crisis of
confidence" that occurs when a large firm goes bankrupt is as a result of the actual bankruptcy,
47
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or the fact that a major business is in financial distress. Accordingly, the contention that filing for
bankruptcy, in and of itself, initiates some kind economic domino effect remains to proven.
Moreover, for some, bankruptcy is not merely the "lesser of two evils." Rather, it is a beneficial
choice. For example, Miron notes that "[f]ailure is an essential aspect of capitalism. It provides
information about good and bad investments, and it releases resources from bad projects to more
productive ones."54
V.

Bear Sterns, AIG, Citibank v. Lehman Brothers

While in the automotive context the American government consistently utilized the Bankruptcy
Code, with regard to financial institutions its choice of process could be charitably described as
erratic.55 During the financial crisis three financial firms were known to have faced financial
distress, and the U.S. government chose to resolve the distress first by a bailout, then by a
chapter 11 case, and then by a bailout. Moreover, it is now apparent that Citibank was in more
trouble than previously acknowledged, and it too was bailed out during the crisis, although with
an even lesser degree of transparency than the already opaque publicly acknowledged bailouts.56
Bear Stearns, the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank, was founded in 1923 and had managed to
survive shocks from the Great Depression through the September 11thattacks, but it ran with the
flock when it decided to place a hefty, leveraged bet on the weak end of the U.S. mortgage
market.57
Specifically, in the summer of 2007 Bear Stearns Asset Management, a hedge fund subsidiary of
Bear Sterns, reported to its investors that its Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Fund
had lost more than 90% of its value, while the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit
Enhanced Leveraged Fund had lost almost all of its investor capital. At one point, the
Structured Credit Fund had around $1 billion in capital, while the Enhanced Leveraged Fund,
which was less than a year old, had nearly $600 million in investor capital. Both funds were
heavily invested in mortgage back securities, both directly and via synthetic structures that used
derivatives to replicate the effects of mortgage-backed loans.58
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After this announcement, the next year saw Bear disclose similar losses in its own trading and
the development of a general run on Bear Sterns began, along with a flood of litigation by
disgruntled investors in the two funds.59 The New York Federal Reserve Bank initially
contemplated acting as DIP lender to Bear Sterns to resolve the situation, but soon the NY Fed
decided its loan would instead support the purchase of Bear Sterns by JP Morgan Chase.60
Additionally, the NY Fed agreed to take over certain risky assets that Chase refused to purchase;
and these assets eventually found a home in an LLC owned by the NY Fed.
Despite these heavy investments by the New York Fed, Bear Sterns shareholders received $10 a
share from Chase.61 In short, Bear Sterns’ creditors were spared from incurring any losses and
its shareholders likely received $10 per share more than they would have in a chapter 11 case.
If the U.S. government thought that saving this one bank had ended the problem, they were
quickly disabused of that notion as the markets increasingly reflected the belief that Lehman was
next. At the same time, although the fact was apparently less widely understood, both AIG and
Citibank were heading toward the precipice as Bear Sterns’ collapse drove down the value of
real estate related assets.62
Seeing that Bear Sterns was not the last bank that would fail, and facing the possibility that the
US government would eventually have to bailout multiple financial institutions, the government
urged the financial industry to formulate a plan to save Lehman. When that effort failed,
Lehman decided to file a bankruptcy petition.
Unfortunately, it seems that neither banking regulators nor Lehman management appreciated that
filing a large corporate bankruptcy case involves a good deal of advanced planning. Rather, both
parties treated the matter more like a homeowner seeking to use bankruptcy on the day of the
foreclosure sale – Lehman’s bankruptcy counsel was only alerted on the day of the proposed
filing. This has sometimes led banking regulators and others to draw faulty conclusions from the
Lehman case – essentially arguing that Lehman shows that Chapter 11 is unsuitable for financial
institutions.
Nonetheless, with the aid of continued lending from the Federal Reserve to Lehman’s brokerdealer subsidiary, Lehman was able to quickly sell its assets to Barclays. Thus, along with the
automotive cases, Lehman represents the third significant use of section 363 during the financial
crisis. Unlike the financial firm bailouts that came before and after it, Lehman’s resolution
would take place in a courtroom, with a transcript.

59
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Lehman stands most in contrast to AIG, which failed almost immediately after Lehman.63
Indeed, given the parallel tracks the two companies were on in the fall of 2008, it is somewhat
surprising that federal regulators did not anticipate the effects that the failure of Lehman would
have on AIG.64
The Fed first bailed out AIG in September 2008 with an $85 billion loan, which restructured
myriad times as some of the company's obligations were shifted to the U.S. Treasury.65 The
New York Fed also led a controversial plan in late 2008 to help AIG cancel over $60 billion in
credit derivative swap contracts with U.S. and European banks by paying the banks in full for
their contracts with AIG.66
In the latter instance, both the Fed and the Treasury resisted efforts by reporters to discover who
these banks were. Ultimately the information was released, and revealed that the Fed had not
only saved several large American financial institutions from distress, but also key German and
French financial institutions. The latter information revealed how the Federal Reserve had taken
on the role of saving not just the U.S. economy, but also that of saving most of the larger
Western economic system.
Then in November of 2008, Citibank neared its own failure, even after it had already taken some
$25 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") funds from the U.S. Treasury to shore
up its capital. Ultimately Citibank would require $45 billion of bailout funds and a ten-year
government-backed insurance policy on more than $300 billion of mortgages and other related
securities before it stabilized. The extent to which Citibank was nearly taken over by the
government and the full extent of its problems were not widely understood until more than two
years latter.
Notably, in all three of the bailouts shareholders in the failed financial institutions managed to
retain their stakes in the companies, avoiding the need to take immediate losses and participating
in a government funded revitalization of the financial institutions. Bondholders in these
companies were spared any losses whatsoever. This stands in stark contrast to Lehman, where
shareholders are apt to be wiped out and bondholders will suffer significant losses.
More broadly, and as noted earlier, Lehman offers a degree of transparency, resulting from the
use of the traditional bankruptcy system, which was totally lacking in the other financial
institution cases. The opacity of the bailouts contributed to the growth of conspiracy theories
during the crisis, including claims that Goldman was favored by government officials and that
TARP recipients were pressured to support administration policy, including the automotive
bankruptcy cases. Many of these conspiracy theories were embraced by academics and others,
and have buttressed a general claim of “lawlessness.” Moreover, while Lehman was able to
proceed according to previously established rules set forth in the Bankruptcy Code and
63
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established by prior chapter 11 cases, the bailouts contributed to the feeling that the government
was acting in an arbitrary and ill considered manner with regard to the distressed financial
institutions.
VI.

Bankruptcy versus Bailout in Canada: The Asset Backed Commercial Paper Crisis

In this section we develop further our thesis that the automotive cases are a good case study for
the effective use of bankruptcy over bailout. We have argued the comparison of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy and the Bear Sterns and AIG bailouts illustrates that our thesis extends
beyond the automotive sector. Here we argue that a comparable, but not identical, regime in
Canada further illustrates that our thesis may also extend across borders where the bankruptcy
system is transparent and clear.
As we have shown elsewhere, the Canadian Companies Creditors Arrangements Act
("CCAA")67 allows a debtor to make use of a quick sale procedure similar to the Chapter 11
procedure.68 However, in Canada the debtor has less ability to “cleanse” assets through the sale
process. Particularly with regard to employee claims, a pre-plan sale under the CCAA is not apt
to be quite as “free and clear” as it American counterpart.
The jurisdictions also differ on the point at which the reorganization procedures – and the sale
process – can be invoked. Canada, like most other jurisdictions, has an insolvency prerequisite
for commencing proceeding, whereas Chapter 11 does not. And the Canadian sale process is
tied to the oversight of cases by the monitor: without the monitor’s consent, it is unlikely that a
Canadian court would approve a pre-plan asset sale.69 In the United States, on the other hand,
there is no such position. Accordingly, a debtor can seek almost immediate approval of a sale
upon filing. Finally, there remains some doubt and conflicting case law in Canada about the use
of the CCAA in circumstances that amount to liquidation, particularly following an asset sale. In
the U.S., it is quite clear that Chapter 11 can be used for liquidation.70
We have shown that it is questions of speed and certainty that marks the biggest difference
between the two jurisdictions, as the CCAA is more than sufficiently flexible to account for
simple procedural differences. It is likely this combination of latter factors that is the most
plausible explanation for the failure to use the CCAA in the automotive cases, although it is also
possible that the Canadian governmental actors involved in the automotive cases preferred to act
in the United States forum, which may have been less transparent to a Canadian observer and
thus less likely to result in political consequences at home.
However, setting aside the question of the advantages and disadvantage of Canada's slower
moving and at times less transparent quick sale process under the CCAA, the CCAA has been
used to effect a bailout of an industry – the Asset Backed Commercial Paper industry – as was
done in Lehman Brothers and the automotive cases. While the government clearly had a role in
67
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the CCAA process, this example is not identical to the American case as it is unclear what was
provided in the way of funding.
Within the recent credit crisis, the asset-backed commercial paper ("ABCP") stood out as one of
the key issues in Canada. Simply put, ABCP is a short term form of investment that is assetbacked. It is a secured debt obligation issued by a limited purpose trust to fund the purchase of
assets that back-up the ABCP and generate cash flow.71 In the United States, ABCP were
commonly referred to as “conduits,” and were widely used before the financial crisis to move
assets off a financial institution’s balance sheet.72 As such, ABCP or conduit structures were
primarily motivated by regulatory arbitrage.
According to Jay Hoffman and Jeffrey Carhart of Miller Thomson LLP, a leading Canadian
corporate law firm, the assets underlying Canadian ABCP are traditionally "made-up of
mortgages and various types of consumer loans and receivables, but many of the trusts currently
hold a significant portion of their assets in the form of credit default swaps, collateralized debt
obligations and other leveraged derivatives instruments."73 The repayment of maturing ABCP is
accomplished via the cash "generated by an issuer's trust's underlying asset portfolio and the
issuance of new ABCP. In addition, to provide ABCP trusts with a back-up source of liquidity,
the trust generally arranges for liquidity support facilities that, subject to satisfying certain
conditions, may be drawn by the issuer on the occurrence of a "market disruption" ..."74 In
Canada, the ABCP market is divided in two. On the one hand, there is ABCP issued by trusts
and managed by Schedule I banks, which are essentially domestic banks authorized under
Canada’s Bank Act to accept deposits;75 on the other, there is ABCP issued by trusts which are
not sponsored and managed by banks.76
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In 2007, on the heels of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the U.S., a liquidity crisis began to
threaten the ABCP market in Canada.77 This crisis was fuelled by investors’ loss of confidence
following the news of defaults on sub-prime mortgages and placed Canadian financial markets at
risk.78 Additionally, the ABCP crisis was the result of a timing mismatch—while ABCP is a
short-term investment, the assets backing it tended to be long-term assets like mortgages and
credit card receivables. As such, there was a timing issue between the cash they generated and
the funds needed to repay the maturing notes.79 During the credit crisis, many investors stopped
buying ABCP and rolling over their notes. Instead, they sought to redeem them. However, as a
result of the timing mismatch, most funds were unable to pay holders of maturing ABCP, which
created a liquidity crisis for holders.80 In short, something like a bank failure developed at the
level of the ABCP trusts. Compounding these problems was the total lack of transparency that
characterized the ABCP market: Noteholders rarely had any idea about the specific assets
supporting their notes and this further added to investors’ lack of confidence.81
As a result of the impending crisis, in August of 2007, a group of financial institutions involved
in the Canadian ABCP market met to form what is known as the Montreal Proposal. Under this
agreement,
[T]hese institutions (and other holders who later signed on) agreed to a 60 day
standstill period during which each party agreed that it would roll-over its nonbank sponsored ABCP on or following its maturity date and would not take any
action that would precipitate an event of default under the trust indenture
government the ABCP. This agreement include[d] a pledge by asset providers to
refrain from making any collateral calls on assets held by the trusts and a pledge
by trust sponsors to refrain from calling on any liquidity provider who signed on
to the proposal to fund under liquidity facilities. In addition, the participants in the
Montreal Proposal agreed in principal to a proposal that would see ABCP
eventually converted to rated floating-rate notes with maturities matching the
maturities of the underlying assets.82
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Essentially, the Montreal Proposal was a “standstill” agreement and represented the first of many
plans made by key Canadian participants to freeze the $32 billion ABCP market in an attempt to
restructure it.83
Following the Montreal Proposal, an investor committee, to be chaired by Purdy Crawford, was
formed to oversee the restructuring of the ABCP market.84 This committee became known as the
Pan-Canadian Investors Committee or the Crawford Committee. Although their plan was “highly
complex and involved many parties,”85 its essence was this: their plan was to convert the
noteholders' paper—which was frozen and worthless—into new, long-term notes that would
trade freely, but at a discounted face value.86 Investors would be informed about the assets
supporting their notes, in an attempt to deal with the transparency issues that precipitated the
crisis in the first place.87 The plan also aimed to address the timing mismatch between the notes
and the underlying assets by changing the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new
notes, as well as adjusting some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the
thresholds for default.88 Additionally, in order to make the notes more secure, the plan would
pool the majority of assets underlying ABCP into two master vehicles.89
The plan also included third-party releases from any liability associated with the ABCP, so the
Noteholders would have to give up their claims, which were mostly tort claims alleging
negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a
dealing/advisor, and acting in conflict of interest.90 Specifically, the plan called for "the release
of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers,
and other market participants – in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the
Canadian ABCP market" – from any liability associated with ABCP…."91 These releases were
necessary to compensate participants for concessions made to facilitate the plan, which included
asset providers assuming an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclosing
certain proprietary information in relation to the assets and providing below-cost financing for
83
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margin funding facilities designed to make the notes more secure; sponsors giving up their
existing contracts; banks providing below-cost financing for the margin funding facility; and
other parties making various contributions to the plan.92 Initially, there were concerns over the
releases in the plan being too broad; as such, a "fraud carve out" was added to exclude certain
fraud claims from the plan's releases.93
However, despite the seemingly balanced approach taken in the plan, a small group of
Noteholders (the “Dissenting Noteholders”), opposed the plan, preferring instead to retain the
option of suing those who had sold them the ABCP.94 More specifically, the Dissident
Noteholders felt that their chances of receiving value under the plan were not sufficient to
surrender their right to litigate. Moreover, the Dissenting Noteholders took issue with the
releases granted under the plan. In particularly, the Dissenting Noteholders questioned whether
the court can sanction a plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are in
fact solvent and not actually creditors of the debtor company.95
Nevertheless, at trial, Justice Campbell, of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, held that the
releases sought under the Plan of Arrangement were fair and reasonable.96 In attempting to
assess the fairness and reasonableness of the plan—post fraud carve out—Justice Campbell
posed seven broad questions in order to reach a decision:
Are the parties to be released necessary and essential to the restructuring of
the debtor?
Are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and
necessary for it?
Can the Court be satisfied that without the releases the Plan cannot succeed?
Are the parties who will have claims against them released contributing in a
tangible and realistic way to the Plan?
Is the Plan one that will benefit not only the debtor but creditor Noteholders
generally?
Have the voting creditors approved the Plan with knowledge of the nature and
effect of the releases?
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Is the Court satisfied in the circumstances the releases were fair and
reasonable in the sense that they were not overly broad and not offensive to
public policy?97
Ultimately, in holding that the plan—including the third party releases—was fair and
reasonable,98 Justice Campbell dismissed the claims of the Dissenting Noteholders,
characterizing their desire to defeat the plan as a “tyranny of the minority.”99 Moreover, he also
stressed the “big picture” thrust of his decision, stating that the ABCP Crisis was “a unique
situation in which it was necessary to look at larger issues than those affecting those who feel
strongly that personal redress should predominate.”100
This decision was then appealed to Court of Appeal for Ontario, where the Court was required to
determine the permissible scope of a restructuring under the CCAA.101 Moreover, on appeal, the
dissenting creditors proposed that if the court can indeed sanction such a plan, then the
applications judge erred in holding that this particular plan was fair and reasonable.102
In response to the dissenting creditors' argument that the CCAA does not permit releases such as
those included in the plan, the Court noted that the CCAA is skeletal and flexible; as such courts
must play a key role in filling in the gaps in the scheme.103 The Court of Appeal added that "[a]n
interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is
apt in this case. As the applications [trial] judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the
financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself."104 Accordingly, in order to facilitate the
broader socio-economic purposes underlying the CCAA, the Court established that third party
releases are indeed permissible where they are reasonably connected to the restructuring at hand.
Blair J.A. summarized this rule, stating that:
The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of
corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided
attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the
fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left
the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the
comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement."105
Ultimately, the court saw no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of
a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring
97
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cannot fall within the framework.106 The Court also held that the releases were reasonably
justified as part of the compromise between the debtor and creditors, as the plan could not
succeed without them and the parties being released from liability made significant contributions
to the plan.
With respect to the opposing creditors' argument that the trial judge erred in finding that the plan
was fair and reasonable, the Court of Appeal disagreed. Here, the Court refused to go against the
trial judge's decision, since he was aware of the merits of all the arguments and negotiated the
compromise of the fraud carve out. The Court noted that the trial judge "was alive to the merits
of the appellants' submissions…. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the
overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole…. It was his call to make."107
Finally, in rendering his decision for the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Justice Blair stressed the
importance of this compromise to the ABCP market as a whole. Situating this case within the
broader context of restructuring proceedings, Justice Blair posited that:
In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. To the
extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be
proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being
called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the
compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that
CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices," inasmuch as everyone is
adversely affected in some fashion.108
Interestingly, unlike the American critique of the automotive cases, focused on the allegation that
the Chapter 11 process was subverted, the Canadian response, which has largely played out in
the media rather than in the academy, did not focus on the distortion of the CCAA process.
Rather, there was a sense that because the CCAA does not provide enough transparency, the plan
and further actions taken in response to the ABCP crisis constituted a "bailout." For example,
Terry Chandler, CEO of Redcorp. Ventures Ltd. and a holder of notes required to vote on the
plan, was critical of the plan, citing a lack of transparency as to how the plan would unfold and a
lack of information based upon which to make an informed decision.109 Similarly, in the same
article, Peter Brown of Canaccord Capital Group claimed that "some big investment firms sold
ABCP in July [of 2007] knowing that some issuers were facing challenges. In an interview, Mr.
Brown said that information was not available to the general market."
In a 2007 editorial entitled "TD May Join ABCP Bailout," the Financial Post outlined the ABCP
"bailout," in which the banks, not the taxpayers (in theory) were to be the ones doing the bailing.
The article noted that:
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The banks operate in a highly regulated environment and one of the regulators …
[and] the Bank of Canada … wants the problem solved. And it wants help from
the banks, the institutions that sold most of the ABCP and which, in some cases,
refused to provide back-up liquidity agreements. And David Dodge, governor of
the Bank of Canada, wants help from all of them, whether they were directly
involved or not. And the central bank has the ultimate power, as well as the power
to use moral suasion with a message along these lines: Solving the ABCP
problem is in the public interest, certainly in the interests of the functioning of the
financial markets, and all participants are expected to do their share …110
However, in a 2008 Reuters article, the Bank of Canada defended itself against allegations of
bailing out the ABCP market, with David Dodge successor Mark Carney asserting that the Bank
never considered using public funds to bailout the country's $35 billion non-asset backed
commercial paper market.111
Outlining why public funds would not be used to "bailout" the ABCP market, Carney stated that
financial market participants "took [ABCP], they are sophisticated … That is not the place to put
taxpayers' dollars or the balance sheet of the Bank of Canada."112 Rather than bailout the
industry, Carney insists that the Bank of Canada was "involved in this situation in a very lighttouch way" in order to solve the "huge coordination problem," between the market participants
involved.113
Despite the confusion as to whether a “bailout” occurred as a result of the ABCP crisis, a 2009
article by Miller Thomson’s Hoffman and Carhart confirms that government funding played a
role in recent enhancements to the Plan. Specifically, they refer to a moratorium period of 18
months following the Plan’s implementation, during which collateral calls on certain credit
default swaps were forbidden, as well as the “provision of an additional $3.45 billion senior
ranking ‘back stop’ margin funding facility to be provided by a combination of Canadian
governments … available to be used for a period of one month following the expiry of the
Moratorium Period if other margin facilities are exhausted.”114 Further, despite the opposition
and confusion that often accompanies allegations of a bailout, many academics—both
domestically and abroad—have lauded the overarching solution achieved during the ABCP
crisis. Indeed, Canada’s ABCP restructuring has been “hailed as a unique, successful, private
restructuring” in response to the credit and sub-prime mortgage crises.115

110

B.
Chritchley,
"TD
may
join
ABCP
bailout"
(Financial
Post),
<http://www.financialpost.com/opinion/story.html?id=d7eefab7-9dc6-44c4-93e5-b6b5ee3761f8>.

111

Reuters, "Bank of Canada didn't Consider ABCP bailout—Carney" (18 February 2010), online
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1820571220080218>[Reuters].

112

Reuters, ibid.

113

Reuters, ibid.

114

Jeffrey Carhart and Jay Hoffman, “Canada’s Asset Backed Commercial Paper Restructuring: 2007-2009”
(2009) 25 Bank. & Fin. L. Rev.35 at 58.

115

Myers and Abiscott, supra note 76 at 5. See also, W.A. Scott & P.J. Henderson, “Restructuring Canada’s
ABCP: A Unique, Successful, Private Restructuring (2009) Int’l Fin. L Rev.

online:

19

VII.

Conclusion

This article began by setting aside the notion that governments always act unfairly or whether it
makes sense to save an industry at all or the causes of the financial failure of the automotive or
financial industries. We were focused on the point where a government has decided to intervene
and the question of how bankruptcy as bailout fares as compared to other bailout options.
Our review of the Chapter 11 automotive cases offers a case study on the effective use of
bankruptcy as an alternative to a government bailout. Our thesis is fleshed out by our
comparison of the Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns cases. However, the Canadian experience
suggests that a country's bankruptcy reorganization system may only be used as an effective
alternative to bailout where the process is transparent and clear.
That is, while both the United States and Canada have highly developed reorganization systems,
in the particular context of a government funded bailout, the extra transparency associated with
Chapter 11 is an additional asset. By comparison, the Canadian ACBP experience played out
through the CCAA, illustrates that bankruptcy is only a better option when the trade offs between
various stakeholders are made clear. Where there continues to be ambiguity about the nature of
the government's intervention and how various stakeholders made out, bankruptcy as bailout is a
less effective option. Only with the transparency can a bankruptcy-bailout mechanism hope to
achieve political legitimacy.
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